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CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: 
AN OXYMORON? 
DONALD L. HOROWITZ 
Now that the latest wave of worldwide democratization has appar-
endy ended, debates have begun about institutions appropriate 
to the consolidation of new democracies. Lively controversies 
have raged about the respective merits of presidential and parlia-
mentary systems, proportional and plurality electoral systems, 
unitary and federal governments.1 No sooner have these debates 
captured the imagination of academicians and policymakers 
than it has become clear that a peculiar set of problems sur-
rounds the maintenance of democracy in societies severely di-
vided along ethnic lines. For these societies, special sets of insti-
tutions seem to be required to insure that minorities who might 
be excluded by majoritarian systems be included in the decision-
making process and that interethnic compromise and accommo-
dation be fostered rather than impeded. 
These issues are oppressing importance in conflict-prone soci-
eties all around the world, from Northern Ireland in Western 
Europe to Bosnia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and 
Cyprus in Eastern Europe, to Tatarstan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
and Moldova in the former Soviet Union, to Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
and Fiji in Asia and the Pacific, to South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, 
and Sudan in Africa. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no agreement 
on the political and constitutional arrangements most likely to be 
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1 I. 
conducive to peace and accommodation in a democratic context. 
Some scholars advocate one set of electoral and governmental 
arrangements; others favor an alternative set. Practitioners often 
have different views altogether. More often than not, for reasons 
I shall elaborate below, inapt institutions or peculiar mixes of in-
stitutions are adopted, with little discernible effect on the con-
flicts they are intended to ameliorate and sometimes with clearly 
dysfunctional effects on those conflicts and on the future of de-
mocracy in the affected countries. 
The present paper seeks to move beyond debates over the con-
figuration of appropriate institutions and to focus on the reasons 
that democratic institutions appropriate to the predicament of 
severely divided societies are unlikely to be adopted by them. The 
debates thus far have had a curiously abstract air about them, in 
the sense that the participants lay down prescriptions for the af-
fected societies, rather as a physician prescribes for a patient, op-
erating on the assumption that the patient can simply choose to 
take the medicine. The trouble with this unspoken assumption is 
that there is no single patient involved at all; instead, there are 
collectivities. To put the point directly, it is very difficult for di-
vided societies to adopt coherent institutional packages or to fol-
low even the very best advice, whatever that might be. The rea-
sons for this difficulty need careful specification, which they have 
not yet received (the issue has hardly even been noticed), for in 
this difficulty lie the seeds of a great many failures of democracy 
and of interethnic accommodation, even in otherwise favorable 
circumstances. Those who prescribe institutions may be quite 
right to think that they would have important consequences, 
were they adopted, but they have been remiss in failing to give 
equal attention to the process that determines whether they will 
be adopted. 
Following a brief description of the substance of the debates 
in this field, the essay turns to the issues surrounding constitu-
tional and political innovation in severely divided societies. After 
enumerating the obstacles to innovation, the essay then consid-
ers whether and how the obstacles can be overcome. In its pres-
ent form, this effort is very much a provisional report on research 
that is still far from completed. The preliminary finding—really, 
still a hypothesis-—is that, even in circumstances apparently most 
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conducive to the adoption of coherent institutions, their adop-
tion is unlikely. 
THE CONTENDING PRESCRIPTIONS 
A great many students of ethnically divided societies have done 
inventories of measures undertaken to promote interethnic ac-
commodation, either within a democratic or an authoritarian 
framework.2 Without attempting to be comprehensive, others 
have occasionally advocated particular measures or policies that 
seemed promising. Still others, particularly recently, have as-
sumed or argued that no such measures are likely to be sufficient 
and have suggested that, for groups that are not territorially in-
termixed, secession should be looked upon with much greater 
favor than it has habitually received.3 The growing receptivity to 
secession is really a counsel of despair that suggests the urgency 
of the issues dealt with here. In fact, secession is usually a very 
bad alternative to attempts of ethnic groups to live together in 
peace, if not in harmony. For one thing, secession places an 
international boundary between former domestic antagonists, 
thereby transforming their domestic conflicts into international 
conflicts, as partition did for India and Pakistan and as multiple 
secessions did for the former Yugoslavia. For another, secession 
cannot provide a clean break, since virtually all secessionist re-
gions are themselves heterogeneous. Rather, secession simplifies 
intergroup confrontations by breaking up ethnically complex 
states into smaller compartments in which the struggles of a few 
groups tend to take a bipolar (or at most tripolar) form and in 
which one group usually emerges dominant and able to take pos-
session of the new, smaller state for its own ends. In practice, to 
endorse secession is not so much to fulfill aspirations to self-de-
termination as to allow some groups to determine the future of 
others.4 
Although receptivity to secession is growing, it is certainly not 
the main academic approach to the problems of severely divided 
societies, as it is not the main approach in practice. Two other ap-
proaches have gained a measure of scholarly acceptance, but nei-
ther has much to show for itself in the actual practice of severely 
divided societies. 
256 DONALD L. HOROWITZ 
1 
4 
The first, and better known, approach to the problems of se-
verely divided societies is consociation, a prescription for treating 
the multiethnic state for some purposes as if it were more than 
one polity and for according to each of the subpolities—the main 
ethnic groups—a considerable degree of veto power and auton-
omy.5 Consociational democracy is not majoritarian democracy 
but a form of consensual democracy, in which all "major groups 
are represented in governing grand coalitions in proportion 
to their numbers, in which elections are conducted by propor-
tional representation in order to insure ethnic proportionality, in 
which major decisions are made by consensus (and so groups are 
accorded vetoes over them), and in-which matters of concern to 
only one group are delegated for decision to that group. This is 
an approach to government that takes ethnic group divisions 
very seriously and is prepared to prevent majorities from ruling 
minorities by altering the rules of the game away from majority 
rule. Ethnic groups and ethnically based political parties are 
taken to be the building-blocks of the system, and conflict is to be 
contained by keeping each out of the affairs of the others and al-
lowing each to prevent governmental action impinging on its dis-
tinctive interests. 
Consociationalism is, then, a plan by which the ill effects of ad-
versary democracy in divided societies are to be kept at bay, for 
electoral minorities heed not risk total exclusion. Everyone is to 
be included in a grand coalition—that is, a coalition of parties 
representing all*the groups, rather than representing any collec-
tion of parties with more than half the seats. Elites form a cartel 
to produce this result. As Arend Lijphart says, "The primary char-
acteristic of the consociational democracy is that the political 
leaders of all significant segments of the plural society cooperate 
in a grand coalition to govern the country."6 
I shall make no effort in this paper to conceal my view that 
consociational methods are inapt to mitigate conflict in severely 
divided societies, that they are more likely the product of re-
solved struggles or of relatively moderate cleavages than they are 
measures to resolve struggles and to moderate cleavages. Nor 
shall I do more than mention the powerful objection that, if in-
deed consociationalism really works as specified, it creates an al-
together too cozy relationship among parties included in govern-
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ment and provides no room for a feature vital to democracy: op-
position.7 Instead, I shall recapitulate some objections to consoci-
ational theory that I have voiced in various other places,8 but 
from then on ask not whether consociationalism is effective when 
adopted but whether it can be adopted intact. For there is no 
doubt, as we shall see, that various features of consociational 
democracy have attractions to some political leaders, usually mi-
nority leaders. And whatever its deficiencies as a means of reduc-
ing conflict, consociational democracy, in its original formula-
tion at least, constitutes a coherent program: its parts are meant 
to fit together. As I shall suggest, the adoption of certain pieces of 
the program without others can produce results at odds with the 
goal of conflict reduction. The question I want to focus on here is 
whether consociational democracy or any other coherent plan 
can be adopted. But first the critique. 
To some extent, lack of adoption of consociational schemes 
may be a function of the insights of decision-makers that those 
schemes will not help them out of the predicament they face as 
leaders in divided societies. It is certainly true that few severely di-
vided societies have gone in this direction, some that are asserted 
to have adopted consociational methods have not actually done 
so, and some that have been coerced toward a consociational 
course (such as Cyprus and, recendy, South Africa) have rapidly 
turned away from that course. 
Insofar as consociationalism requires leaders to parcel out sov-
ereign power to ethnic groups in divided societies, it seems plain 
enough that those who have all of state power within their reach 
have no incentive to take a large fraction of it and give it away. 
The most likely motive advanced, the awareness by leaders of the 
risk of mutual destruction, is based on a time horizon not gener-
ally employed in the calculations of political leaders: apres moi le 
deluge. In any case, it certainly is not clear to them in advance that 
disintegrative conflict is not best deterred by a system that keeps 
power in,their own hands. Furthermore, the sentiments of lead-
ers and followers in divided societies are hardly conducive to 
what are regarded as concessions to the other side. If statesman-
ship is required, then it needs to be pointed out that the assump-
tion that elites are invariably less ethnocentric than their sup-
porters is without foundation. Most studies do not show leaders 
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to be less ethnocentric than their followers, and some studies 
show that ethnocentrism actually increases with education.9 
Whatever the dispositions of leaders may be, when leaders have 
tried to compromise, it has been shown repeatedly that leader-
ship leeway is very narrow on issues of ethnic power in severely di-
vided'societies. Compromisers can readily be replaced by extrem-
ists on their flanks, once the latter are able to make the case that 
a sellout of group interests is in progress. In short, no mechanism 
can be adduced for the adoption or retention of consociational 
institutions, particularly no reason grounded in electoral politics. 
In conditions of free elections, the very creation of an in-
terethnic coalition, whether intended to be a grand coalition or 
not, gives rise to ethnic opposition parties and so precludes such 
a coalition, even if it endures, from becoming a grand coalition. 
It is no accident that not one of the four developing countries as-
serted by Lijphart to be consociational in the 1970s—Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles—had a grand 
coalition. Each had a coalition of parties, opposed by others, not 
a "coalition of the segments,"10 and some violated other consocia-
tional criteria as well. Malaysia followed rules of disproportion, 
rather than proportion, had no mutual vetoes, and allowed only 
limited cultural autonomy. Lebanon had a presidential system, 
which Lijphart argues is inimical to power-sharing. India, as-
serted by Lijphart to have followed the consociational course,11 
has never had a grand coalition in the independence period and 
is a leading example of adversary, rather than consensual, 
democracy in Asia. 
The electoral system favored by consociationalists, list-system 
proportional representation, insures the representation of ethni-
cally based parties in proportion to their underlying votes, but 
this hardly can guarantee conciliatory results. If it fragments the 
electorate, list PR may give rise to coalitions, but there is nothing 
inherent in that electoral system that provides incentives to cre-
ate an inclusive or grand coalition, as opposed to the usual sort of 
majority coalition. In many countries using list PR, adversary, ma-
joritarian democracy has flourished. Where parties are ethnically 
based, as they are in severely divided societies, list PR is perfecdy 
compatible with the domination of some groups by others. 
The combination of list PR and ethnically based parties is in-
Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron ? 259 
imical to incentives to make electoral appeals across group lines 
that might reduce the exclusive character of ethnic outcomes. 
With ethnic parties and list PR, the zero-sum relations of party 
lists to each other translates into a zero-sum competition between 
ethnic groups as well.12 Absent PR, various distortions of electoral 
outcome—for example from accidents of electoral demography 
that produce wasted majority votes—might accidentally give mi-
norities more than a proportionate share of seats and thus miti-
gate the severity of minority exclusion. PR eliminates distortions, 
benign as well as malign. 
A rather different approach also takes ethnic group politics as 
the starting point and aims at multiethnic government, but with-
out reversing majoritarian practices. Instead, it aims at majoritar-
ian decisions made by a moderate, interethnic center. The un-
derlying mechanism is based on incentives. The objective is to 
make multiethnic participation and compromise rewarding to all 
the participants who practice it. The approach differs in yet an-
other way from consociationalism, because it does not require 
that leaders act on conciliatory feelings that do not exist; it as-
sumes only that they will follow their interests.13 Unlike consocia-
tionalism, this approach does not rest on a specified set of struc-
tures to be adopted invariably from country to country but upon 
certain mechanisms that the structures are to be designed to 
bring into play. 
Since such an approach is based on political incentives, it re-
quires some institutions that are specially tailored to majority 
rule in divided societies. The underlying mechanisms lie in in-
ducements to politicians and their followers to engage in in-
terethnic cooperation. Sometimes these inducements are supple-
mented by structures that simultaneously heighten intraethnic 
divisions, for fractions of groups may have greater incentives to 
cooperate across group lines than do entirely cohesive groups. 
The institutions that have such effects are largely territorial or 
electoral. 
Depending on how boundaries are drawn, federalism can frag-
ment groups and induce intergroup accommodation. When 
Hausa-Fulani dominance of all of Northern Nigeria was broken 
by new federal arrangements that divided the former Northern 
Region into states, new parties arose in minority areas of the 
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North, for now they had a chance to control a state rather than 
engage in a futile competition with a majority party within the 
undivided region. The weakened grip of the Hausa-Fulani pro-
vided a strong inducement for Hausa-Fulani politicians to seek al-
lies from among other groups, something that a feature of the 
electoral system introduced in 1978 also induced them to do. I 
shall return to this example shortly. 
Electoral systems are crucially important institutions in push-
ing political leaders toward ethnically conciliatory or ethnically 
exclusive strategies. If, for example, an electoral system rewards 
parties and politicians who take account of the interests of voters 
from groups other than their own, those parties and politicians 
will learn how to behave in an accommodative fashion. If the goal 
is to produce a moderate, interethnic center, it is necessary to 
provide ethnically based parties with electoral incentives to take 
moderate positions on issues of interethnic relations and to form 
electoral alliances and governing coalitions with moderate par-
ties of other ethnic groups. Absent such electoral incentives, 
where parties break along ethnic lines, as they habitually do in di-
vided societies, democratic business-as-usual results in the bifur-
cation of the included and the excluded. Group A, whose party 
holds 60 percent of the parliamentary seats, simply excludes 
Group B, with 40 percent. 
Some multiethnic states have stumbled across apt institutions 
to mitigate polarization of this kind, often using electoral incen-
tives to encourage moderation, and a few have begun to explore 
more deliberate constitutional measures to achieve these objec-
tives. To be sure, ethnic demography often makes the task diffi-
cult. Heterogeneous constituencies, usually essential to the cre-
ation of conciliatory electoral systems, are not always easy to 
construct. Group settlement patterns may result in territorial sep-
aration. And it will require coherent packages of institutions, not 
partial adoptions, to make such incentives to intergroup accom-
modation effective. 
Because this approach is designed to reward political leaders 
for interethnic moderation, sustaining the system, once it is 
adopted, will be much easier than sustaining consociational ar-
rangements that are based merely on exhortations and constitu-
tional constraints, devoid of political incentives. The politician 
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who has benefited from appealing to voters across group lines 
will obviously see this behavior as being in his or her interest. 
Still, the threshold problem of adoption remains. Rather than in-
novate with an. explicit view to conciliation, most states, most of 
the time, have adhered to institutions associated with their for-
mer colonial power or to institutions that were otherwise familiar 
to them. Very few states have learned from the actual experience 
with ethnic conflict of any other state. 
THE COHERENT PACKAGE PROBLEM 
This, then, is the depressing state of the available wisdom on one 
of the most important problems of the contemporary world: how 
to achieve democratic inclusion in severely divided societies. Two 
main approaches compete for acceptance, neither yet verifiable 
by the actual experience of divided societies, due to ^threshold 
problem: precisely because the societies are divided, their divi-: 
sions prevent them from taking action to breach their divisions, 
and so one cannot say whether the action would be effective .if 
taken. 
Both approaches need coherent packages of institutions to re-
duce conflict. Consociational theory demands (1) grand govern-
ing coalitions of all the main groups; (2) proportional repre-
sentation elections; (3) proportional representation by ethnic 
groups in cabinet membership, public offices, and distribution of 
resources; (4) consensual rather than majority decision-mak-
ing—that is, mutual group vetoes; and (5) a large measure of 
group autonomy. This is an elaborate set of interlocking struc-
tures, a fixed basket of institutions. 
If consociational measures work to reduce conflict, they work 
together. If some parts of the package were adopted but others 
were not, the results could be worse than doing nothing at all. 
For example, with list-system proportional representation in a 
system of ethnic parties (the usual situation), the number of seats 
won by the various parties will tend to reflect the ethnic propor-
tions of the voting-age population. If, as a concession to obtain 
adoption of proportional representation, the group that wanted 
PR agreed in return to abandon the equally consociational de-
mand for consensual decision-making (that is, group vetoes), the 
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result would be the worst of both worlds: majority exclusion of 
the minority, abetted by an electoral system that, by assuring the 
minority could gain only minority support, perfected the exclu-
sion and made it more predictable. A good case can be made that 
just such an incoherent compromise is the fate of many consocia-
tional proposals once they are negotiated. The more general 
point is that the way in which the features of a constitutional de-
sign combine or break apart has much to do with outcomes that 
are intended or perverse. Proportional representation may look 
functional in a divided society if group vetoes guarantee consen-
sual outcomes, but it looks dysfunctional without those vetoes. 
Again, the total package is decisive. 
The incentives approach does not require specific structures. 
It is, for example, at home with any of several different electoral 
systems, depending on the context—and I shall soon mention a 
couple of these systems—provided that the system is strongly con-
ducive to interethnic moderation in the appeal for votes and pro-
vided that the system is adopted across the board, so that moder-
ation in one governmental body is not undone by countervailing 
incentives to extremism in another. But coherent, consistent 
packages of this kind are most unlikely to be produced by the po-
litical process that typically surrounds the adoption of innova-
tions to reduce conflict in severely divided societies. This is for 
reasons I shall specify in a moment. 
The disjunction of process and substance forms the core of my 
argument. So many forces favor the pursuit and exacerbation of 
conflict—and even deadly violence—in severely divided societies 
that anything less than a coherent package is unlikely to provide 
a sufficient counterweight to those forces, and yet only partial 
measures that are doomed to fall short of the coherent package 
stand a real chance of adoption most of the time. 
To see why this is so, it will be necessary to delve into some ac-
tual examples of ameliorative measures that were adopted but 
proved inadequate, but first I want to make explicit a point I only 
hinted at earlier. Those polities that most need institutions to re-
duce interethnic conflict are those that are most unlikely to 
adopt them. The very conflicts that make compromise essential 
preclude agreements to facilitate compromise. Politicians bene-
fitting from hostile sentiment toward other groups are unlikely to 
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transform the conflict-prone environment that supports their po-
litical careers. That does not mean that conflict-reduction meas-
ures can never be adopted—the subject of this paper would be 
completely uninteresting if this were the case—but that they can 
be adopted, if at all, only at limited times and under certain con-
ditions. Usually, political leaders will conclude, as Archbishop 
Makarios did with respect to the consociational measures that 
gave Turkish Cypriots weight in government far out of propor-
tion to their numbers, that there is no reason to make such con-
cessions.14 Timing and leadership motivation are crucial vari-
ables here. 
Now to examples of ameliorative measures that were adopted 
but proved inadequate—Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia—and 
one ongoing example—Fiji—that, while still in the formative 
stage, also promises to be inadequate. In each case, policymakers 
hit upon an appropriate conciliatory device but found it insuffi-
cient to bear the full weight of ethnic conflict by itself. 
In Nigeria (1978), the device adopted was the separately 
elected president, combined with an electoral system designed to 
guarantee that the winning candidate was moderate on matters 
of interethnic relations. The electoral formula involved two sets 
of requirements: plurality plus geographic distribution. The win-
ning candidate had to receive the largest number of votes plus at 
least 25 percent of the vote in at least two-thirds of the then-19 
states. Since territory was a proxy for ethnicity, the intention was 
to preclude even two of the three main groups (Hausa, Yoruba, 
and Ibo) from combining to win the election without minority 
support. The system worked exactly as intended. The victor in 
the first presidential election, Shehu Shagari, proved to be a 
panethnic figure. The problem was that no similar electoral sys-
tem was adopted for the Nigerian legislature, whose members 
were elected from largely homogeneous constituencies on a for-
mula requiring only a plurality. Those members acted simply as 
representatives of their own ethnic groups; they were not in-
clined to interethnic conciliation; and their pursuit of conflict 
helped cancel out Shagari's pursuit of accommodation. So here 
is a case in which the benign effects of one institution—even 
when combined with another, the federalism that reduced Sha-
gari's party's core support and so made it even more inclined to 
L 
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accommodation—were outweighed by the negative effects of still 
others. This is a paradigm of the inadequacy of anything less than 
a coherent package. 
In the same year (1978), Sri Lanka also moved to a presiden-
tial system, partly to enable strong leadership to take the meas-
ures required to achieve a compromise with the Tamils, There, 
too, an accommodative electoral formula was adopted. The pres-
ident was to be elected by a system of alternative voting, a 
method of election that had enormous potential for minority 
votes to tip the balance between two Sinhalese candidates and so 
to provide incentives for one of them to be moderate on issues of 
concern to Tamils. As in Nigeria, the legislature was elected 
under a different system likely to produce less conciliatory re-
sults. Unfortunately, moreover, by the.time of the first presiden-
tial election under the new system, ethnic conflict had become so 
acute that Tamils essentially did not participate, thus effectively 
forfeiting the potential influence of Tamil voters in the presiden-
tial election. By the time of the next election (1988), a civil war 
was being fought in the Tamil areas, and an electoral boycott was 
conducted there. In short, the very promising alternative vote sys-
tem never had a chance because it had been adopted so late in 
the development of the conflict. This, too, is a recurrent feature 
of ameliorative innovations: when there is time to act, the matter 
is not urgent; when the matter is urgent, there is no longer 
enough time. 
The third example is Malaysia, where, at independence, Ma-
laysians had stumbled upon an accommodative political arrange-
ment for their very deeply divided society. For a variety of idiosyn-
cratic reasons, a Malay party, a Chinese party, and an Indian party 
had formed a coalition to pool each others' votes. To do so, the 
coalition partners/had to compromise on interethnic issues. For 
some years, those compromises saved Malaysia from becoming a 
deadly society of the sort Sri Lanka has become. But two prob-
lems continued to erode the Malaysian arrangements and the 
compromises that sustained them. Both are characteristic of the 
forces that work against durable democratic institutions in di-
vided societies. 
The first derived from the process of interethnic bargaining by 
which the Malaysians came to their constitutional agreement in 
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the first place. The Malays and Chinese had traded some incom-
rrxensurables, among them citizenship to the Chinese in return 
for unspecified measures to advance the Malays economically. 
The,former (citizenship) was conferred at a stroke; the latter, a 
matter of economic development, could not be handled in the 
same way. When, years later, Malays regretted the little they had 
achieved economically, that realization gready unsetded the basis 
of the constitutional bargain, jeopardized any further interethnic 
compromise, and in the end reduced the extent to which the 
Chinese were included in the political process. 
The second, more powerful force for erosion derived from the 
Malaysian electoral system, which made the exchange of Chinese 
and Malay votes for coalition candidates a significant phenome-
non in only some parliamentary constituencies, rather than all. 
Whether the moderate interethnic center could prevail over the 
respective Malay and Chinese extreme parties by pooling moder-
ate Malay and Chinese votes depended on the particular demog-
raphy and pattern of party support in a given constituency. Con-
sequently, the need to pool votes across ethnic lines—which, 
according to the incentives view of conciliation, is the very foun-
dation for interethnic compromise—could easily be weakened by 
changing the territorial boundaries of parliamentary constituen-
cies. By 1974, electoral boundaries had been thoroughly gerry-
mandered so as to produce more Malay-majority constituencies 
and to pack Chinese voters into fewer constituencies, but with 
much greater Chinese majorities in the latter. In such constituen-
cies, Chinese would essentially waste their votes by electing fewer 
legislators but with overwhelming support.15 
On the one hand, then, accommodative institutions were un-
dermined by other features of the founding compromise that en-
couraged the groups to measure the benefits and declare any 
shortfalls a breach of the agreement, casting the legitimacy of the 
constitutional settlement in question. And, on the other hand, 
precautions had not been taken against alteration of the elec-
toral situation that had provided .the foundation for compromise. 
Finally, a quick look at what is emerging in Fiji, a dangerously 
divided society with a chance to restore a democratic and inclu-
sive system. In 1996, the Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
rendered a long and thoughtful report, informed by the desire to 
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make Fiji a democratic society that can manage its ethnic prob-
lems between Fijians and Indians.16 In 1987, a military coup by Fi-
jian forces had rejected an elected but disproportionately Indian 
government. Three years later, the military regime had promul-
gated a strongly pro-Fijian constitution that triggered consider-
able international criticism. As a result, the regime had been 
forced to promise a serious review. Among other things, the Con-
stitution Review Commission proposed an electoral system, based 
on alternative voting, intended to foster political cooperation be-
tween moderate Fijian and Indian parties. Were it possible for 
this system to be adopted for a large number of ethnically hetero-
geneous constituencies, there is little doubt that it would pro-
duce a moderate, multiethnic, coalition government. Each of the 
two major groups has habitually divided its support between two 
parties of unequal electoral strength. These subethnic divisions, 
reflected in party politics, would provide conditions conducive to 
the formation of an interethnic coalition, flanked by ethnic par-
ties opposing its compromises. Even after considerable enlarge-
ment of constituencies, however, the fraction of significantly het-
erogeneous seats was less than half of the total. Fiji, moreover, 
has: a long history of reserving large numbers of seats for mem-
bers of particular groups who are elected on the votes of mem-
bers of their group alone (that is, reserved seats and communal 
rolls). Much as it might have liked to do so, the Commission 
felt itself unable to abolish all reserved seats, for that would 
have been an unsettling break with tradition and a step into the 
unknown that would surely have made the Commission's rec-
ommendations unacceptable. Instead, the Commission recom-
mended that 25 reserved seats (12 Fijian, 10 Indian, 3 other mi-
norities) be retained, and that the remaining 45 open seats 
(about 30 of them heterogeneous in composition) be elected by 
alternative voting. 
Necessary though this course may have been, what it did at the 
outset was to dilute the conciliatory effects of alternative voting 
and to permit the members elected from reserved seats to consti-
tute a built-in drag on compromise, for the electoral dynamics of 
their homogeneous constituencies will propel them to take ex-
treme positions. As in Nigeria, one set of institutions would work 
against the other, producing an inconsistent set of incentives. 
. i 
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Following receipt of the Commission's report, the balance be-
tween reserved and open seats was altered further by a Joint Par-
liamentary Select Committee on the Constitution, which recom-
mended 46 reserved seats and only 25 open ones (23 Fijian, 19 
Indian, 4 other).17 At the same time, it recommended constitu-
tional provisions for a compulsory "multi-party Cabinet which 
would, as far as possible, be a fair representation of all parties 
represented in Parliament."18 Both of these proposals were in-
corporated in the new constitution, which provided for much 
smaller, and therefore less heterogeneous, constituencies and for 
a requirement that all parties with at least 10 percent of the seats 
in the lower house be invited to be represented proportionately 
in the cabinet.19 However, this requirement of party inclusion in 
government was not accompanied by any constitutional require-
ment for consensual government. Rather, government needs 
only the confidence of the majority of the house.20 Minorities are 
not to have a veto. 
What seems to have happened is that the desire of minority 
politicians to find their way into government conjoined with the 
desire of Fijian politicians to restore the international legitimacy 
Fiji had lost after the events of 1987.21 The desire for certainty of 
inclusion in government pushed Indian politicians toward conso-
ciatiorial impulses, while a desire for certainty of representation 
had frightened Fijian politicians into retention of a majority of 
reserved seats. Meanwhile, British parliamentary conventions 
had produced the usual provision about the confidence of-the 
house. The result is a little consociationalism (if a minority op-
tion to join the cabinet can be considered consociational), even 
less in the way of electoral incentives to accommodation, and a 
large, residual dose of majoritarian institutions. Within a matter 
of months, the smaller of the two Fijian parties had joined, and 
some months later already left, the cabinet, so that the inclusive 
character of the coalition had already been ruptured. The leader 
of the larger Indian party declared the long constitutional crisis 
resolved, and Fiji was readmitted to the Commonwealth from 
which it had been expelled ten years earlier. 
This was a hybrid constitution, if ever there were one. 
(Whether any constitution is other than a hybrid is a question to 
which I shall return.) From the standpoint of consociationalism, 
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a proportional electoral system, cultural autonomy, and mutual 
vetoes are absent. From the standpoint of electoral; incentives, 
unreserved seats are too;scarce, the unreserved seats are insuffi-
ciently heterogeneous in composition, and, because post-elec-
toral coalitions are not based on compromise necessary to lure 
votes across group boundaries, they are inadequate to foster con-
ciliation. From the standpoint of majority rule, proportional in-
clusion of all parties in the cabinet means the end of opposition. 
(If some parties leave the cabinet, on the other hand, the conso-
ciational impulse is defeated.) Containing many professions of 
the need for interethnic accommodation, the new constitution is 
assuredly more liberal than its predecessor, but it points toward 
no clear path to conciliation. 
B - 1 1 
! 
THE COMMON SOURCES OF DIFFICULTY 
In these diverse examples—and in many others—there are a 
number of common sources of difficulty. (There are also a num-
ber of hopeful possibilities, even in these examples, but these I 
leave for the concluding section.) It is necessary to identify the 
common impediments to coherent institutional packages that 
are necessary to reverse the conflict dynamics of severely divided 
societies, both to see how recur rent—and even built-in—they are 
and to think about how they might be overcome. 
First, there is the problem of knowledge. Decision-makers, in-
cluding constitutional engineers, in most countries are utterly 
unaware of the techniques that have been utilized and the meas-
ures that have been adopted in other divided societies to pro-
mote interethnic accommodation. In many countries, there has 
been until recently only a most imperfect awareness of even the 
commonality of problems from one country to another: most 
have tended to think their problems were unique. When they 
seek to innovate, most decision-makers borrow (or sometimes 
avoid) institutions from countries with which they are most famil-
iar, whether or not the institutions are apt for their predicament. 
Ex-colonial countries typically opt for the institutions associated 
with the mother country, often with unfortunate results. Benin, 
for example, adopted the French presidential runoff system, 
thereby turning its tripolar ethnic cleavages into more intrac-
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table bipolar ones. Negative learning also takes place. Although 
both Serbia and Macedonia might have benefited from federal 
institutions that accorded a measure of autonomy to their un-
happy Albanian minorities, .both "learned" from the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia that federalism promotes disintegration, rather 
than integration. There is a very large failure of knowledge at 
both ends: (1) failure of states to analyze their own problems ac-
curately and to cast a net widely and in the right direction and 
(2) failure of external agencies to help in the dissemination of 
usable knowledge. 
Second, related to failures of knowledge at the site of innova-
tion, there is a failure of expertise more generally. Many special-
ists, called in to help design systems in lands far from home, sim-
ply bring along their usual tool kits, which were developed for 
more or less homogeneous societies. One might well call these 
visitors provision merchants. In the electoral field, reflecting 
debates that have litde pertinence to the problems of divided so-
cieties, they typically advocate (depending on their own prefer-
ences) systems that will produce proportionality of seats to un-
derlying votes, or strong and cohesive parties, or a limited num-
ber of parties and stable governments, or representatives in close 
touch with those who elected them. These, after all, constitute 
the usual evaluative criteria for electoral systems in societies that 
are not severely divided. More narrowly, they are the ingredients 
in the enduring but for present purposes inapposite debate be-
tween advocates of plurality and of proportional systems. The 
only purpose of electoral innovation that is of life-or-death rele-
vance to the problems of divided societies—producing induce-
ments to compromise and accommodation—finds no place in 
this debate, no place in the traditional literature on electoral sys-
tems, and generally no place in the on-site advice of experts. 
A splendid example is the electoral system adopted in Papua 
New Guinea at independence. There, an even narrower set of is-
sues dominated debate over the electoral system. The system, 
borrowed from the colonial power, Australia, was alternative vot-
ing, a preferential system with, as I have suggested, considerable 
power to foster intergroup accommodation, by requiring candi-
dates who wish to reach the majority required for election to gain 
second-preference support from voters of groups other than 
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their own. This system, imposed as if by accident, had exactly the 
conciliatory results one might anticipate.22 Soon after independ-
ence, however, the alternative vote was scuttled, in favor of first-
pas t-the-post, on grounds a simpler system was more desirable. 
The results were immediately apparent in the next elections, in 
which candidates were returned on small pluralities and with no 
support outside their own group.23 Expertise had failed Papua 
New Guinea miserably by focusing only on the mechanics of bal-
loting. Ironically, this was a case in which a more apt ex-colonial 
institution was rejected in favor of a less apt one in greater cur-
rency elsewhere. 
Third, beyond any problems of knowledge, there are enor-
mous disjunctions between what severely divided societies re-
quire and the methods that are used to decide on the institutions 
that will govern those societies. Typically, although the setting 
varies widely, negotiation is the method by which proposals are 
hammered out. Negotiation has its own exigencies; it entails bar-
gaining, trading, and splitting differences. If obstacles arise be-
cause the participants have divergent preferences, they may ex-
change incommensurables to overcome the obstacles, thereby 
producing a melange of institutions or even enshrining inconsis-
tent solutions to problems within the same document. With ne-
gotiation, one may contrast planning, a process intended to pro-
duce internally consistent solutions to problems. Even from a 
process of planning, of course, perfectly coherent outcomes are 
unlikely, but in any case, in democratic constitutional design, 
bargaining and negotiation are the main modalities. Bargaining 
has much to commend it, but coherence is not among its virtues. 
Of course, it is not bargaining alone, but the specific prefer-
ences likely to be entertained by ethnic party leaders in constitu-
tional negotiations. They seek to reduce uncertainty in different 
ways. Majorities attempt to retain- majoritarian institutions inso-
far as possible, while minorities search for guarantees. Consocia-
tional schemes seem to provide guarantees, however illusory they 
may prove to be in operation, and minorities find them attrac-
tive. Majorities are not keen on guarantees for minorities, need-
less to say, and they are certainly not inclined to the panoply of 
guarantees provided by consociational theory. If need be, they 
will agree to some fraction of guarantees, such as proportional' 
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cabinet representation or perhaps a PR electoral system, but they 
will find minority vetoes especially unattractive. Neither the lead-
ers of majority ethnic parties nor of minority ethnic parties will 
be tempted to embark on electoral innovations that encourage 
candidates to seek marginal votes from voters of groups other 
than their own. Although such innovations are conducive to in-
terethnic compromise, they risk electoral poaching on what 
would otherwise be the secure clienteles of ethnic parties, and 
they also pose the more general risk of uncertain electoral out-
comes. When ethnic parties produce more or less predictable 
electoral results, a modicum of risk aversion will impel party lead-
ers to reject.systems that create greater uncertainty. Ironically, 
the very virtue of such systems for divided societies lies precisely 
in the uncertainty they generate by virtue of greater fluidity of 
party choice by the electorate. But interethnic virtue here consti-
tutes intraethnic vice. 
The result of this pattern of preferences is a distinctly subopti-
mal outcome. A few guarantees of minority participation, partic-
ularly in the cabinet, can be conceded by the majority. Especially 
if a majority-dominated regime is under international pressure to 
become less transparendy ethnocratic, there are benefits for the 
regime in such a concession, which the minority will welcome. In-
centive-based proposals will be less attractive to both sides. Un-
less there is external imposition of the constitution, as there was 
in Cyprus in 1960, or a minority regime is in an unusually strong 
position to dictate transitional institutions, as in South Africa in 
1994, no strongly consociational scheme will be adopted. Even in 
these cases, the arrangements were not durable, just as the Niger-
ian and Malaysian incentive-based electoral institutions, both of 
them partial, were subject to erosion. 
The pattern of preferences I have depicted explains the out-
come in Fiji and implies that it is not idiosyncratic but is likely to 
be typical—not the only outcome, no doubt, but probably the 
most common. Those who plan constitutions may be persuaded 
that consociational or incentive-based arrangements are prefer-
able, but their influence in the negotiations that lead to adoption 
is likely to be marginal. 
I hasten to add, of course, that planning is a problematic cat-
egory to begin with. Has anyone, after all, ever succeeded in 
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planning any large institutional change? If we look to the United 
States Constitution, it may seem coherent in retrospect, but it was 
very much the product of ad hoc behavior at every step of its fram-
ing. Some of its institutions most celebrated as embodying its dis-
tinctive genius, especially those that support the separation of 
powers, were the product of compromise or usurpation. The bi-
cameral solution to the big state-small state problem, with each 
state to have an equal number of votes in the, Senate, was the re-
sult of the "great compromise" that saved the Philadelphia Con-
vention; and the presidency was designed in committee by a 
small clique that wanted a vigorous executive and presented the 
office as a fait accompli to a convention deeply divided on the 
issue and certainly not disposed toward the proffered solution by 
anything like a majority.24 By the same token, to say that bargain-
ing determines outcomes is not to indicate anything about the 
identity, position, power, or preferences of the bargainers. 
Clearly, it matters whether some of them are in power and others 
out, whether some can thwart the constitutional change, whether 
the players are bargaining in the shadow of some larger forces, 
and so on.25 I do not contrast coherence as an end with bargain-
ing as a means in order to argue that either of these categories is 
truly homogeneous but only to suggest that the two deserve jux-
taposition in this context. 
I particularly want to insist on coherence as a virtue of consti-
tutional design for severely divided societies, because their cen-
trifugal forces are so strong that without equally strong, consis-
tent, centripetal institutions their divisions tend to become acute. 
In a word, strong ethnic affiliations and ordinary democracy 
combine to produce political exclusion of minorities. The fact 
that coherence is rare and bargaining is common does not make 
me naive so much as it makes me skeptical. My central proposi-
tion embodies the paradox that substantial compromise on a 
plan to facilitate interethnic compromise decreases the likeli-
hood of interethnic compromise in the operation of the plan 
once adopted. 
Fourth, severely divided societies have not always been well 
served by well-intentioned third parties that have tried to assist in 
mediating solutions. Those third parties whose specialty is neg0~ 
tiation are most unlikely'to know very much about severely «1-
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vided societies. Third-party mediators tend to be interested, 
above all, in having the parties reach agreement. Mediators and 
negotiators receive their rewards (sometimes even Nobel Prizes) 
for reaching agreement: they receive an advance against per-
formance that will not need to be repaid if performance later 
falls short. By then, they will be working on another problem. 
Third-party mediators have even stronger interests than negotia-
tors do in reaching agreement, for they, unlike the participants, 
do not have to live with the results. They are often called "facilita-
tors," a term that apdy describes their role, which is to "get peo-
ple to the table," "maximize areas of agreement," or "get to 'yes.'" 
They measure success by the achievement of agreement, and 
their method is wholly processual, which is to say that it is con-
tent-neutral.26 If anything is clear in the field of ethnic conflict, it 
is that the content of ameliorative institutions is not something 
about which the participants can afford to.be neutral. It follows 
that not any agreement is preferable to none. 
In some ways, the most dangerous people in a negotiation are 
third parties, those with only detachment to offer. Anything a 
third-party facilitator can point to in order to induce moderation 
is probably already discounted in the conflict. Does it stand to 
reason.that those with less interest in the conflict are likely to see 
a reason for moderating the conflict that the parties, who are 
more intensely interested in it, have failed to discern? It may be 
that the incentive to join the European Union will soften the in-
transigent behavior of ethnic antagonists in Eastern Europe, al-
though the willingness of Lebanese, Cypriots, and Sri Lankans to 
destroy their entrepot and tourist trades suggests that the lure of 
prosperity is hardly infallible in inducing moderation. In any 
case, it is not merely a matter of altering the willingness to make 
concessions that is crucial—although this is what third parties 
focus on—but of altering the incentives and behavior of the an-
tagonists once they have made concessions at the threshold, and 
this depends on what arrangements they agree to. Here third 
parties are generally not helpful, for at best they are process ex-
perts without substantive expertise in the institutions that would 
reduce conflict,27 and they are likely to see the issue in terms of 
the antagonists' reluctance or inability to summon up the requi-
site "political will." 
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Fifth, the assumption is frequently made about severe conflicts 
that if the parties could not agree before and can agree on some-
thing now, this is a good first step, even if that something is not 
quite apt to ease their relations. If it is wrong at the outset, it can 
be fixed later. This assumption is usually incorrect. Interests 
quickly crystallize around whatever arrangements are adopted, 
even if they are dysfunctional, so that even if the institutions fail 
in their public objectives, there are actors whose private success 
comes to depend on the maintenance of the arrangements. This 
is most visible in the case of Fiji, where it proved impossible to 
dislodge the reserved seats even when a fresh start was to be 
made. Two of the most prominent techniques used by structural 
engineers (those who build bridges and buildings) to avert fail-
ure are redundancy—that is, extra capacity—and midcourse cor-
rection, using feedback. For constitutional engineers, midcourse 
correction is not readily available, since players quickly get at-
tached to the initial institutions that facilitated their success. All 
that is left, therefore, is redundancy. As I have suggested, some 
features of the intractable ethnic conflicts dealt with here posi-
tively require redundancy, because the whole point of the 
arrangements is to create institutions that will counter, and 
counter strongly, again and again, the preexisting incentives of 
the parties that produced and sustain the conflict at high levels. 
In a divided society, it is fortunate if consensus can be reached 
on any institutions, much less truly apt institutions. Yet it is wrong 
to think that whatever the parties agree to will be durable. All an 
agreement means is that it was acceptable to the parties at the 
moment it was consummated. Other agreements, including 
much better agreements, might also have been acceptable. It is a 
mistake to elevate the existence of agreement over the content of 
agreement when it comes to societies prone to violent conflict. 
Yet that is what is done, over and over again. 
NEW DEPARTURES 
Up to this point, it might be appropriate to read this paper as a 
lament. For the most part, after all, severely divided societies 
have not had the conflict-reducing institutions they need. In 
many cases—among them Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, 
. r i ll 
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Rwanda, and Sri Lanka—the results have been truly catastrophic. 
Further catastrophes are waiting in the wings. In the post-
Communist world, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, 
Kirghizia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Crimea, among others, 
have so far been very lucky. Much of the pessimism, as I have em-
phasized, derives from the difficulty of finding procedures that 
are likely to yield the institutional packages divided societies 
need. And so there is a certain prima facie reason for pessimism. 
One could paint an even bleaker picture. I have not touched 
on the whole question of timing. A careful examination of the oc-
casions for constitutional rethinking in severely divided societies 
reveals that those occasions are few. They tend to occur in the 
wake of disasters (thirteen years of civil war and military rule in 
Nigeria) or at those rare moments when momentous general 
changes are in place {the collapse of Communism or the end of 
colonialism). These are not everyday occurrences, and so, in ad-
dition to all the other impediments to arriving at apt arrange-
ments, there is the prior condition: the existence of.an occasion 
for rethinking the matter at all. Moreover, not all of these mo-
ments are conducive to apt innovation. If we ask what it takes to 
induce ethnic majorities or ethnic groups otherwise politically 
advantaged to agree to accommodative institutions that do not 
reinforce their advantages, we have limited the occasions for apt 
innovation considerably. The end of Communism or of colonial-
ism alone was surely not sufficient. 
The exceptional character of the occasions for innovation is 
suggested by one case in which the requisite inducements were 
present: Nigeria 1978. Nigerian leaders knew they did not wish to 
return to the institutions they (righdy) believed were conducive 
to conflict. More than that, they were unsure who would be vic-
timized in the next conflict and so were eager to design institu-
tions that would make ethnic domination difficult. That they did 
not fully succeed is attributable more, to deficiencies of constitu-
tional technology than of attitude. The Nigerians quite clearly 
wore John Rawls' "veil of ignorance." Most groups, most of the 
time, will come to the table unveiled. 
Do the many failures of institutional innovation and the mal-
adroit efforts of outsiders, then, necessarily consign the unlucky in-
habitants of conflict-prone countries to lives that are precarious, 
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uncomfortable, and possibly quite short? There are a few promis-
ing openings that remain to be explored at all and on which I in-
tend to focus. 
The first is that there is a small but discernible tendency to-
ward the development of a more encouraging species of constitu-
tional engineering. The worldwide growth of democracy has 
made it uncomfortable for regimes that observe democratic 
forms but exclude minorities from effective political participa-
tion to continue to do business this way. Moreover, when occa-
sions do arise for constitutional innovation, it has become in-
creasingly clear that the making or remaking of a constitution is 
an international and comparative venture in a way that it was not 
generally seen to be a couple of decades ago. This is an impor-
tant change that has not received the notice it deserves. The 
Nigerians began to think in these terms in 1978, when their Con-
stituent Assembly took at a closer look at unfamiliar American in-
stitutions that they believed might help them escape their 
predicament. Much more recently, the South Africans, in the 
making of their interim constitution and now in the making of 
their permanent constitution, have cast a very wide net in the 
search for ideas. Tatarstan gave some attention to practice else-
where (Puerto Rico, in fact!) when it negotiated its asymmetrical 
federalism with Russia. The Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
traveled and consulted around the world, in a careful quest for 
institutions apt for the divisions it confronted. In general, the 
cascading democratizations of the early 1990s led those charged 
with constitutional innovation to begin to think their problems 
were not sui generis. 
Yet a strong case can be made that more information has gen-
erally not translated into more usable knowledge, that it has 
meant either more blind copying or very crude adaptation of in-
stitutions in use (or in vogue) elsewhere, to produce yet more 
peculiar hybrids. There seems to be an emerging tendency, for 
example, toward the adoption of mixed electoral systems, with a 
newly imported system used for some seats or offices and the 
preexisting system used for the remainder. Constitutional bor-
rowing in general is a subject for another day, but the more lim-
ited point can be made now that the comparative analysis that 
would need to be done by decision-makers to make borrowing 
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effective in their home conditions has so far been done very su-
perficially. This calls to mind the impulses of leaders in many di-
vided societies a decade or two earlier to examine what would 
be required to make their countries just like Switzerland—can-
tonization and all.28 
A second potentially promising development suggests a way 
out of the problem of inducing participants who benefit from 
the pursuit of ethnic conflict to embark on a quest for accom-
modative arrangements. In some of the most dangerous cases, it 
turns out that precisely those leaders who have interests in pur-
suing conflict are sometimes obliged to put constitutional deci-
sion-making in other hands. When that happens, there is an 
opening for breaking out of conflict-enhancing incentives. That 
was the case in Nigeria in 1978, when the military regime 
yielded to pressure to create a Constituent Assembly. It has been 
the case in Northern Ireland, where the British and Irish gov-
ernments have been the sources of innovation; and.it was also 
the case in Fiji, where, as in Nigeria, a military regime was 
obliged to create an independent constitutional commission. 
The contending parties on Cyprus-have so far been conducting 
their prenegotiations under the aegis of the United Nations. 
(One could say that the Dayton Accords that produced the 
Bosnia-Croatia federation derive from a similar lifting of deci-
sion-making from familiar to unfamiliar hands, but the Dayton 
results are hardly of the sort that can be commended.) Finally, 
the need of governments to conform to Western standards of 
human rights or to quell the anxieties of investors may yet pro-
duce a comparable (and perhaps benign) involvement of out-
siders in the process of constitutional innovation, although, as I 
have argued, the involvement of third parties who specialize 
merely in negotiation will surely be insufficient. 
If this is so, then the prospects may not be quite as bleak as I have 
suggested they are. There will still be enormous problems of pro-
ducing coherent and apt institutions, but at least the process will 
not always be foreclosed at the outset by the interests of political 
leaders. The focus of my ongoing research, therefore, is on dis-
cerning whether the involvement of outsiders (commissions of in-
quiry and the like) and the growing practice of turning constitu-
tion-making into a comparative exercise show signs of producing 
278 DONALD L. HOROWITZ 
the sort of internally consistent, coherent plan that I have argued 
severely divided societies need. For if, as I have hypothesized, co-
herent constitutional plans for conflict reduction are unlikely to be 
adopted, then this hypothesis ought to be able to withstand a test in 
the circumstances most favorable to its falsification. If, for example, 
even in conditions most hospitable to elaborate constitutional 
innovation, what recurrendy gets adopted is a melange of incon-
sistent provisions, then it may be concluded that the hypothesis 
is true.29 
There are several circumstances that may create such favor-
able conditions. There may be an element of constitutional im-
position from outside, as in Northern Ireland. Alternatively, as I 
mentioned earlier, the existing regime may find its position suffi-
ciently precarious or illegitimate that it is obliged to delegate the 
formulation of proposals to outsiders, as the Nigerian military 
regime did in the late 1970s and the Fijian military regime did 
in the 1990s. Similarly, a regime may find constitution-making 
power essentially usurped, as African regimes did in the early 
1990s, when unofficial but powerful "national conferences" ap-
peared on the scene in Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in Francoph-
one Africa. In such cases, the weakened state of the regime ren-
ders it liable to accept plans it might otherwise dismiss, and the 
forces for bargaining that produce inconsistent outcomes may be 
temporarily disabled. In still other cases, new regimes may come 
to power as a result of civil war or the fall of Communism; and, 
committed to a fresh start on ethnic issues, they may be especially 
eager to receive expert advice. Eritrea had elaborate consti-
tutional processes and proposals as a result of such a regime 
change. Regimes that are unusually dependent on the good will 
of outsiders, particularly the confidence of foreign investors that 
ethnic conflict will be kept under control, may go out of their way 
to propitiate external forces by constitutional designs. There are, 
then, many roads that lead to conditions hospitable to coherent 
constitutional plans for severely divided societies.30 
I cannot say for sure what will result from this research, but 
perhaps I can introduce what may prove to be an important in-
tervening variable: the ambition of the constitutional plan. That 
this is an important issue is suggested by the Northern Ireland 
Agreement of 1998.31 The agreement is generally, but not per-
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fectly, consociational,32 largely because of the power of the exter-
nal British and Irish authorities to dictate the overall shape of the 
arrangements (although not the particulars). The agreement 
contains numerous interesting features, but the one I wish to 
highlight here is its maximal ambition. 
The agreement provides for a very large measure of ethnic 
proportionality in a variety of institutions, and it makes an ad-
vance promise of ethnic equality and—in a fascinating phrase— 
"parity of esteem" for the two main groups. The phrase is signifi-
cant, because it goes right to the heart of what divided societies 
struggle over: whose country this is, who will dominate whom, 
what the terms of political incorporation will be. Certainly, 
groups in Northern Ireland have struggled over these issues, par-
ticularly the question of whose symbols were entitled to priority 
of esteem. At a stroke, the agreement promises to bring these 
struggles to an end, to preempt them, and implicitly to measure 
future political performance by its conformity to the objective of 
parity of esteem. Given the (at best) spotty record of political sys-
tems in divided societies in providing for the fair treatment of all 
major groups within them, the agreement sets Northern Ireland 
up for a possible shortfall. The aptness of the institutions estab-
lished for Northern Ireland will be sorely tested by the need to 
meet such maximal standards, rather than merely to muddle 
along in a more or less peaceful state—which is what ordinarily 
passes for success when groups are inclined to severe conflict. 
The proposed arrangements might just prove durable, were 
they intended to produce only incremental change in intereth-
nic relations. Indeed, it is a frequent criticism • of consociational-
ism that its arrangements, especially mutual vetoes, are con-
ducive to minimal government in general. One would think that 
this extraordinarily ambitious agenda would require consider-
able political support for the emergence of a moderate middle to 
accomplish it. Institutions that include no likely electoral support 
for intergroup compromise, that in fact are premised on the elec-
toral status quo,33 form a particularly unpromising basis for such 
a political transformation. To put the point provocatively, how 
can the ambitions of the proposals be realized in the face of 
something approaching vetoes accorded to the unreconstructed 
ethnic parties? 
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If Northern Ireland promises to be a state freighted with bur-
dens too great for its institutions, the Cyprus discussions may be 
going in an opposite direction, almost to the point of abandon-
ing the interethnic state. A host of outside bodies is involved: the 
United Nations, Britain, the United States, the European Union, 
among them. The impulses of at least some of these outsiders 
seem to embody two main ideas: an extremely decentralized fed-
eration, with only those matters requiring central coordination 
to be handled by the central government, and a central gov-
ernment designed somehow to prevent majority domination.34 
Whereas government in Northern Ireland would be required to 
shoulder heavy burdens in contentious areas, the central govern-
ment on Cyprus might be divested of all such burdens (and most 
others as well). So far as ethnic relations go, a new regime on 
Cyprus would have a light agenda indeed. 
This leads me to speculate that there may be four likely out-
comes of constitutional processes for divided societies. The out-
comes are scaled by the ambition of their designers and the 
character of the institutions to be introduced. The first, sug-
gested by Serbia and Slovakia, among many others, is ethnically 
exclusivist, either because the constitution identifies the state 
with a single group or because straightforward majority rule 
produces such a result de facto. This is, of course, an exceedingly 
common outcome. The second, exemplified by Fiji (1997) and 
Nigeria (1978), is a hybrid of institutions combined in such a 
way as to be inadequate to generate the requisite compromise. 
The third, illustrated by Northern Ireland, is largely consocia-
tional, but probably inadequate to sustain the heavy burden of 
change laid upon it by external forces eager to transform the 
conflict dramatically from the start. The fourth, possibly typified 
by Cyprus, is a minimalist regime, entrusted with doing nothing 
to change the status quo, because everyone is incredulous of 
any prospect of doing so. The ambitions range from roughly 
zero in the first case, to mere peacekeeping in the fourth, to 
modest accommodation in the second, to serious transformative 
efforts in the third. If this is the range of likely outcomes, the 
one combination it excludes is a coherent set of institutions, 
committed to compromise and capable of effecting at least 
modest conflict reduction. 
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I t may be "that the re is n o const i tut ional solution to be found 
to t h e case of really radical social diversity."35 Tha t is, n o institu-
t ions may be adequate to cabin the conflict. This conclusion is 
not yet warranted by the evidence, because part icular s t ructures 
do seem to p roduce par t icular ben ign results when they invoke 
appropr ia te mechanisms, even where the ensemble of institu-
t ions does no t p roduce ben ign results overall. Still, it may be tha t 
no process is adequate to p r o d u c e an ensemble of inst i tut ions 
that are adequate ; and on tha t the p r o p e r view at this po in t , it 
seems to me , is pessimistic agnosticism. 
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